The picture of Palestinian public opinion as it relates to the political situation today is mixed. On the one hand, there is a great deal of criticism of the Hamas government for its poor performance and the difficult living conditions most Palestinians are facing. On the other hand, if elections were held today, the overwhelming majority of those who have voted for Hamas in elections earlier this year would vote for Hamas again.

Fatah is not yet seen by the public as a viable alternative to Hamas, even though Fatah has a little bit of an edge over Hamas in recent polls, about 2 or 3 percentage points. There is still a significant part of the public, about 12 percent, who are undecided, and as we have seen in previous cases, most of those voters go to Hamas in the end.

We also have a similar dynamic regarding attitudes toward the peace process. On the one hand, two-thirds of the public tells us that Hamas should not recognize the State of Israel -- one of the conditions of the Quartet -- but at the same time there is a similar percentage -- sometimes a little bit less, sometimes a little bit more -- that says we should recognize the State of Israel as a State for the Jewish people as part of a peace agreement and a two state solution. So the attitude of the public is that there should be recognition of Israel, but only as part of a peace agreement.

Hamas, therefore, does not have to justify its position in terms of recognition of Israel for the time being. This is part of the reason why the public, even though it is not satisfied with Hamas' performance and is currently suffering from economic sanctions, is not critical enough of Hamas to shift loyalty and vote for some other party.

The Palestinian public wants recognition of Israel. The only question is when.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has three choices to try to get around the difficult situation in which Hamas' election has put him. He can dismiss the Hamas government, although I think this is an empty threat that in the end might not bring about a change in Hamas. The second choice is to declare a state of emergency, which would allow him to control the government. This may or may not be helpful; it depends on how one interprets the powers and responsibilities of the president under emergency regulations. And the third choice is to forge an agreement with Hamas on a form of a national unity government.

Reaching an agreement with Hamas has been Abbas' preference, and it may still be possible, albeit in a different formulation than is usually put forward. Hamas might agree to form a government of technocrats, or a government that does not have strong senior representation from Hamas.

There is pressure on Abbas to dismiss the government entirely, which would be a constitutional violation of his powers. If he bows to this pressure and defies the basic law, it could be the first shot in a Palestinian civil war.

Both sides are in full agreement on the need for a ceasefire. I think a comprehensive ceasefire -- one that would include cessation of violence as well as a prisoner release -- is achievable, and could be a part of a national unity government.

A crucial step that the international community can take is to help strengthen Abbas and help him to take steps that would make him more popular, to give him more popular support vis-à-vis Hamas. So far, Abbas doesn't have that advantage, although polls show he is a bit more popular now than Hamas. But the bottom line is that Abbas has to be seen by the public as being able to deliver at a time when Hamas is failing to govern effectively.

Secondly, the international community needs to reassess the conditions it placed on the Hamas government (no aid or acceptance until Hamas recognizes Israel, ends violence and abides by previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements). They should be seen as conditions that can be modified, and Hamas should not necessarily have to meet all of them immediately: it should be okay if Hamas only meets half of them as long they are showing signs of moderation.

If this is the case, the international community should be willing to engage with Hamas. The result of that engagement should be the resumption of aid, if the international community sees Hamas moving towards moderation.

The situation is not entirely bleak. There has been an important political development in internal Palestinian politics that could potentially augur well for the future.

There have been Fatah-Hamas discussions about the two-state solution, and how to bridge the gap separating the two groups. Fatah supports the two-state solution while Hamas rejects it. But Hamas representatives have essentially told their counterparts, "If the majority of the public supports your views we will not accept that, but we would respect it. Even if we are part of a national unity government, and Abbas comes back to us with an agreement he signed with Olmert, and that agreement has the support of the majority of the Palestinians, we will accept it."

This, I believe, is the way forward; a national unity government in which Hamas is willing to make a concession or a compromise or to moderate its views on the peace process, although not necessarily on principles. They won't change their principles of no recognition of Israel -- and this makes progress more difficult -- but they are willing to show moderation on the process.

If the majority of Palestinians are in support of an agreement -- which would be determined by a referendum or some other way of ascertaining what the public thinks -- Hamas is basically saying to Fatah, "we will not impede the process of peace making." This, I believe, is highly positive, and I think that things are not as bad as they may seem. There is a way forward.

The picture of Palestinian public opinion as it relates to the political situation today is mixed. On the one hand, there is a great deal of criticism of the Hamas government for its poor performance and the difficult living conditions most Palestinians are facing. On the other hand, if elections were held today, the overwhelming majority of those who have voted for Hamas in elections earlier this year would vote for Hamas again.

Fatah is not yet seen by the public as a viable alternative to Hamas, even though Fatah has a little bit of an edge over Hamas in recent polls, about 2 or 3 percentage points. There is still a significant part of the public, about 12 percent, who are undecided, and as we have seen in previous cases, most of those voters go to Hamas in the end.

We also have a similar dynamic regarding attitudes toward the peace process. On the one hand, two-thirds of the public tells us that Hamas should not recognize the State of Israel -- one of the conditions of the Quartet -- but at the same time there is a similar percentage -- sometimes a little bit less, sometimes a little bit more -- that says we should recognize the State of Israel as a State for the Jewish people as part of a peace agreement and a two state solution. So the attitude of the public is that there should be recognition of Israel, but only as part of a peace agreement.

Hamas, therefore, does not have to justify its position in terms of recognition of Israel for the time being. This is part of the reason why the public, even though it is not satisfied with Hamas' performance and is currently suffering from economic sanctions, is not critical enough of Hamas to shift loyalty and vote for some other party.

The Palestinian public wants recognition of Israel. The only question is when.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has three choices to try to get around the difficult situation in which Hamas' election has put him. He can dismiss the Hamas government, although I think this is an empty threat that in the end might not bring about a change in Hamas. The second choice is to declare a state of emergency, which would allow him to control the government. This may or may not be helpful; it depends on how one interprets the powers and responsibilities of the president under emergency regulations. And the third choice is to forge an agreement with Hamas on a form of a national unity government.

Reaching an agreement with Hamas has been Abbas' preference, and it may still be possible, albeit in a different formulation than is usually put forward. Hamas might agree to form a government of technocrats, or a government that does not have strong senior representation from Hamas.

There is pressure on Abbas to dismiss the government entirely, which would be a constitutional violation of his powers. If he bows to this pressure and defies the basic law, it could be the first shot in a Palestinian civil war.

Both sides are in full agreement on the need for a ceasefire. I think a comprehensive ceasefire -- one that would include cessation of violence as well as a prisoner release -- is achievable, and could be a part of a national unity government.

A crucial step that the international community can take is to help strengthen Abbas and help him to take steps that would make him more popular, to give him more popular support vis-à-vis Hamas. So far, Abbas doesn't have that advantage, although polls show he is a bit more popular now than Hamas. But the bottom line is that Abbas has to be seen by the public as being able to deliver at a time when Hamas is failing to govern effectively.

Secondly, the international community needs to reassess the conditions it placed on the Hamas government (no aid or acceptance until Hamas recognizes Israel, ends violence and abides by previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements). They should be seen as conditions that can be modified, and Hamas should not necessarily have to meet all of them immediately: it should be okay if Hamas only meets half of them as long they are showing signs of moderation.

If this is the case, the international community should be willing to engage with Hamas. The result of that engagement should be the resumption of aid, if the international community sees Hamas moving towards moderation.

The situation is not entirely bleak. There has been an important political development in internal Palestinian politics that could potentially augur well for the future.

There have been Fatah-Hamas discussions about the two-state solution, and how to bridge the gap separating the two groups. Fatah supports the two-state solution while Hamas rejects it. But Hamas representatives have essentially told their counterparts, "If the majority of the public supports your views we will not accept that, but we would respect it. Even if we are part of a national unity government, and Abbas comes back to us with an agreement he signed with Olmert, and that agreement has the support of the majority of the Palestinians, we will accept it."

This, I believe, is the way forward; a national unity government in which Hamas is willing to make a concession or a compromise or to moderate its views on the peace process, although not necessarily on principles. They won't change their principles of no recognition of Israel -- and this makes progress more difficult -- but they are willing to show moderation on the process.

If the majority of Palestinians are in support of an agreement -- which would be determined by a referendum or some other way of ascertaining what the public thinks -- Hamas is basically saying to Fatah, "we will not impede the process of peace making." This, I believe, is highly positive, and I think that things are not as bad as they may seem. There is a way forward.