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| Khalil Shikaki |
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A PhD recipient from Columbia University in 1985, Dr. Shikaki served as a professor at various universities, including Birzeit University, al-Najah National University and the University of Wisconsin, before moving to the Brookings Institute as a Visiting Fellow in 2002. He has conducted hundreds of polls amongst the Palestinian public, and is currently serving as Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.
His writings have been featured in newspapers around the world, including al Sharq al Awsat, The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian and LaVanguardia. His most recent book, Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process: Long Term Trends and Policy Implications, focuses on many years of research conducted from polls of the Palestinian people.
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Khalil Shikaki
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A PhD recipient from Columbia University in 1985, Dr. Shikaki served as a professor at various universities, including Birzeit University, al-Najah National University and the University of Wisconsin, before moving to the Brookings Institute as a Visiting Fellow in 2002. He has conducted hundreds of polls amongst the Palestinian public, and is currently serving as Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.
His writings have been featured in newspapers around the world, including al Sharq al Awsat, The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian and LaVanguardia. His most recent book, Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process: Long Term Trends and Policy Implications, focuses on many years of research conducted from polls of the Palestinian people.
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| Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions |
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The Council on Foreign Relations,
(01/01/1999)
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The emergence of what may become a democratic, secular, and pluralist society in the Arab world is of particular significance. If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in creating a modern society that fully respects human rights and the principles of the United Nations, it will be an achievement of interest to the entire world. The symbolic dimension is obvious. It influences both the survival of a people and the peace of a sensitive region. Above all, it is of significance to the Arab world if Palestinians, so fragile and disadvantaged, are nevertheless capable of creating a society fully adapted to the standards of the modern world.
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The Council on Foreign Relations,
(1999/01/01)
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The emergence of what may become a democratic, secular, and pluralist society in the Arab world is of particular significance. If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in creating a modern society that fully respects human rights and the principles of the United Nations, it will be an achievement of interest to the entire world. The symbolic dimension is obvious. It influences both the survival of a people and the peace of a sensitive region. Above all, it is of significance to the Arab world if Palestinians, so fragile and disadvantaged, are nevertheless capable of creating a society fully adapted to the standards of the modern world.
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| Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process |
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United States Institute of Peace,
(01/01/2006)
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Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. Palestinian willingness to compromise is greater than it has been at any time since the start of the peace process. This increased willingness to compromise provides policymakers with greater room to maneuver.
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United States Institute of Peace,
(2006/01/01)
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Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. Palestinian willingness to compromise is greater than it has been at any time since the start of the peace process. This increased willingness to compromise provides policymakers with greater room to maneuver.
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| Settlements or Peace |
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Palestine-Israel Journal,
(04/01/2000)
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The Palestine-Israel Journal interviewed Khalil Shikaki.
Palestine-Israel Journal: An accumulation of reasons sparked the Intifada and then created a kind of momentum. In your own analysis, do you think that the peace process itself was a reason behind this Intifada?
Khalil Shikaki: There is no doubt that the people’s anger and frustration with the lack of progress in the peace process has damaged the peace process and has caused it to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians. Therefore, the accumulation of deep anger led to more support for confrontation and violence. Sharon’s visit was simply the spark that lit the fuse. Without addressing the fundamental reasons for the anger, this feeling will re-emerge, and there will be no end in sight for the current confrontations.
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Palestine-Israel Journal,
(2000/04/01)
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| Commentary: Peace and Palestinian Public Opinion |
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Middle East Times,
(10/20/2006)
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The picture of Palestinian public opinion as it relates to the political situation today is mixed. On the one hand, there is a great deal of criticism of the Hamas government for its poor performance and the difficult living conditions most Palestinians are facing. On the other hand, if elections were held today, the overwhelming majority of those who have voted for Hamas in elections earlier this year would vote for Hamas again.
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Middle East Times,
(2006/10/20)
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The picture of Palestinian public opinion as it relates to the political situation today is mixed. On the one hand, there is a great deal of criticism of the Hamas government for its poor performance and the difficult living conditions most Palestinians are facing. On the other hand, if elections were held today, the overwhelming majority of those who have voted for Hamas in elections earlier this year would vote for Hamas again.
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| The Peace Process and Political Violence |
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MERIA,
(03/01/1998)
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Since security in this process has been of paramount importance to the Israeli side, Palestinians have also focused on security. Most of the attention of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been, in fact, on trying to maintain security for the Israelis since the beginning of the peace process. But because of the eruption of violence from time to time, the Israelis delayed implementation of the agreement signed with the Palestinians.
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MERIA,
(1998/03/01)
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Since security in this process has been of paramount importance to the Israeli side, Palestinians have also focused on security. Most of the attention of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been, in fact, on trying to maintain security for the Israelis since the beginning of the peace process. But because of the eruption of violence from time to time, the Israelis delayed implementation of the agreement signed with the Palestinians.
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| With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace Process |
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Brandeis University,
(02/01/2007)
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The January 2006 Palestinian elections were expected to stabilize highly negative domestic dynamics and bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. Instead, Hamas, the Islamist group, won 44% of the national vote and 56% of the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to the nationalist Fatah’s 41% of the national vote but only 36% of the seats. One of the immediate consequences of the elections has been further deterioration in internal Palestinian conditions and the collapse of any hopes for immediate resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Concern grew over the potential for major internal violence and for a resumption of open warfare between Palestinians and Israelis.
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Brandeis University,
(2007/02/01)
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The January 2006 Palestinian elections were expected to stabilize highly negative domestic dynamics and bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. Instead, Hamas, the Islamist group, won 44% of the national vote and 56% of the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to the nationalist Fatah’s 41% of the national vote but only 36% of the seats. One of the immediate consequences of the elections has been further deterioration in internal Palestinian conditions and the collapse of any hopes for immediate resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Concern grew over the potential for major internal violence and for a resumption of open warfare between Palestinians and Israelis.
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| “The Palestinian Responses to the "Road Map" to Peace” |
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The Middle East Center at the University of Utah,
(02/02/2004)
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My talk today is about Palestinian responses to the road map to peace. The road map has been tabled for almost a year now and has gone nowhere. My talk will focus on why this is the case and what the Palestinian perception of the road map has been.
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The Middle East Center at the University of Utah,
(2004/02/02)
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My talk today is about Palestinian responses to the road map to peace. The road map has been tabled for almost a year now and has gone nowhere. My talk will focus on why this is the case and what the Palestinian perception of the road map has been.
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| ‘Could new policies in the Middle East serve American interests more effectively?’ |
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Boston Review,
(03/01/2005)
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In today’s Middle East, the United States confronts several threats ranging from radical Islamist militancy to the unregulated spread of technologies of WMDs. Responding to these threats, American leaders have identified several vital American interests in the region: securing the domestic United States by defeating Islamist terrorists, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of oil at stable prices, preventing the spread of WMDs, and ensuring Israel’s security. Different American administrations have ordered these priorities differently as their urgency, and the nature of administrations and their domestic contexts change.
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| Shikaki: PA President Abbas Would Benefit From National Unity Government With Hamas |
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Council on Foreign Relations,
(02/07/2006)
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Shikaki, who also is a senior fellow at Brandeis University's Crown Center for Middle East Studies, says exit polls that showed Fatah winning the election were flawed because Hamas urged its supporters not to talk to exit interviewers in order to prevent Fatah supporters from possibly destroying ballots if they thought Hamas was winning.
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Council on Foreign Relations,
(2006/02/07)
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Shikaki, who also is a senior fellow at Brandeis University's Crown Center for Middle East Studies, says exit polls that showed Fatah winning the election were flawed because Hamas urged its supporters not to talk to exit interviewers in order to prevent Fatah supporters from possibly destroying ballots if they thought Hamas was winning.
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| The Politics of Paralysis II: Peace Now or Hamas Later |
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Foreign Affairs,
(08/01/1998)
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Yasir Arafat and his loyalists have been the backbone of Palestinian support for the Oslo peace process, but Arafat will not live forever. Already, the corruption and repressive practices of his Palestinian Authority have sapped support for Oslo. His Islamist foes will not remain on the sidelines. Palestinian society's traditionalism makes the fundamentalists of Hamas the only credible alternative to Arafat's center, and they feed off frustration over Israeli intransigence. If the diplomatic deadlock, graft, and illiberalism continue after Arafat, Hamas could well take over.
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Foreign Affairs,
(1998/08/01)
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Yasir Arafat and his loyalists have been the backbone of Palestinian support for the Oslo peace process, but Arafat will not live forever. Already, the corruption and repressive practices of his Palestinian Authority have sapped support for Oslo. His Islamist foes will not remain on the sidelines. Palestinian society's traditionalism makes the fundamentalists of Hamas the only credible alternative to Arafat's center, and they feed off frustration over Israeli intransigence. If the diplomatic deadlock, graft, and illiberalism continue after Arafat, Hamas could well take over.
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